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Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences
over candidates, even though preferences over assemblies are the natural analytic starting point. 
This  candidate-based approach is usually justified by an assumption that preferences over
assemblies are separable.  We show that if preferences over assemblies are themselves derived
from underlying preferences over legislative or economic outcomes, then preferences over
assemblies will not in general be separable.  We then suggest, through discussion of a paper by
Sugden, that a candidate-based analysis may be misleading even when one can legitimately
assume separable preferences over assemblies.
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On Candidate-Based Analyses of Assembly Elections
1
by
Jean-Pierre Benoit  and Lewis A. Kornhauser
23
In many elections a group of people, or assembly, is selected.  These elections include the
United States Senate, school boards, and city governments.  Since assemblies are being elected, a
natural analytical starting point is voters’ preferences over these assemblies.   On the other hand,
4
in these elections voters are typically asked to vote for individual candidates, not assemblies as a
whole.  For this reason, undoubtedly, analysts have often assumed that voters have well-defined
preferences over candidates and pursued their analyses in terms of these candidate preferences. 
However, this starting point is problematic.
Analysts typically justify, explicitly or implicitly, a candidate-based approach with an
assumption that preferences over assemblies are separable (defined below).  However, little work
has been done as to the reasonableness of this assumption.  In this Note, we show that if
preferences over assemblies are themselves derived from underlying preferences over legislative
or economic outcomes, then preferences will not in general be separable.  We then suggest,
through discussion of a paper by Sugden, that a candidate-based analysis may be misleading even
when one can legitimately assume separable preferences over assemblies.
SEPARABILITY OF PREFERENCES OVER ASSEMBLIESBenoit/Kornhauser
The extension of sincerity outlined in the text is not the only possible extension.  Cox [1990]
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for example considers a spatial model in which an individual votes for the candidate who is
closest to the individual’s ideal point in the policy space.  Such a vote is "expressive" of the
voter’s preferences and will generally not be simple.  See Benoit and Kornhauser [1995] for an
extensive discussion.
 See Benoit and Kornhauser (1991, 1995) for more on this.
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Although assembly preferences are fundamental, there is a condition under which
candidate preferences may unambiguously be derived from these assembly preferences. 
Consider the election of an m-sized assembly.  For any two candidates a and a, let X  be a set of iji j
(m-1) candidates not including a or a.  Let > and $ denote the preference relations.  ij
Definition:  Assembly preferences are separable if for all a, a, A , and B , {a}UA  > i j ij ij i ij
{a}UA  implies {a}UB  $ {a}UB . ji j ii jji j
Separable assembly preferences generate a natural ranking of the candidates.  Namely,
Definition: An individual ranks candidates simply if a > a if and only if there exists an ij
A  such that {a}UA  > {a}UA . ij i ij j ij
Consider a voter with k votes to cast for k different candidates.  Simple voting extends the
notion of sincere voting to assembly elections in which votes are cast for candidates, rather than
assemblies.  A simple voter always prefers every candidate for whom she votes to every
candidate for whom she does not vote.   Thus,
5
Definition:  An individual votes simply if for all a for whom she votes and a for whom ij
she does not vote, {a}UA  $ {a}UA  for all A .  i ij j ij ij
When preferences are separable, a simple ranking of candidates and simple voting are
possible.  An individual then votes simply by voting for her top k candidates.   Because simple
6
rankings and simple voting permit a straightforward analysis of assembly elections in candidate
terms, analysts often assume that preferences are separable.  Benoit/Kornhauser
Suppose that some voter ranks the candidates a  > a  > a  > a  > a .  Table A presents the
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twelve assembly rankings that are consistent with this candidate ranking:
Table A:  Assembly Preferences that are consistent with
the Candidate Preferences a  > a  > a  >a  > a 123 45
1234567891 0 1 1 1 2
1 s ta aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
2 n d aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
3 r d a aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 23 23 23 23 23
4 t h a aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 15 15 23 23 23 23 23 14 14 14 14 14
5 t h a aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 23 23 15 24 24 15 24 15 15 24 24 24
6 t h a aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 24 24 24 15 34 24 15 24 24 15 15 34
7 t h a aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 25 34 25 25 15 34 34 25 34 25 34 15
8 t h a aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 34 25 34 34 25 25 25 34 25 34 25 25
9 t h a aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
1 0 t h a aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
3
How reasonable is the assumption of separability?  The assumption is clearly quite
restrictive.  For instance, if there are five candidates running for a two-person assembly, there are
10! possible (strict) orderings of assemblies.  On the other hand, there are 5! strict rankings of
candidates each of which is consistent with 12 distinct separable orderings of assemblies.   Thus,
7
of the 10! possible assembly rankings, only 5! x 12 are separable.  The fact that separability is
restrictive, however, does not in itself indicate whether or not it is a reasonable condition.  We
address this question in the next section.
SEPARABILITY AND OUTCOME-BASED PREFERENCES
We have argued that the natural starting point for the analysis of assembly elections is
assembly preferences.  Typically, however, assemblies are not ends in themselves but rather are
constituted to determine some economic or political outcomes.  One could reasonably argue that
preferences over these legislative outcomes should be the starting point.  Note, however, that ifBenoit/Kornhauser
This point is not new.  See, for instance, Austin-Smith and Banks (1991).
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the outcomes that an assembly will enact can be perfectly predicted then there is a one-to-one
correspondance between assemblies and legislative outcomes, so that these two starting points
are not in conflict.  Nonetheless, starting from outcome preferences entails important restrictions. 
We now show that assembly preferences that are derived from outcome preferences will not
generally be separable.
We begin with two examples.  First, suppose that the legislative outcome can be
described as a real number from 0 to 1.  Individual candidates adopt a position on this interval. 
Consider two-member assemblies and suppose that the outcome of an assembly is given by the
mean of the assembly members’ positions.  Suppose there are four candidates, two each at
positions x = 0 and y = 1, vying for the two seats.  Then an individual whose favorite outcome is
0.5 will favor a candidate at y to one at x, to complete an assembly whose other member is at x,
but will have the reverse ranking if the other member is at y.  Hence, this individual’s assembly
preferences are not separable.
8
Consider now an election for a three-person assembly that will reach majority rule
decisions on three separate issues, each of which can be decided 0 or 1.  Consider six candidates,
two each at positions x = (1,1,0), y = (1,0,1), and z = (0,1,1) and a voter whose favorite outcome
is (1,1,1).  The voter prefers a candidate at z to one at x to complete an assembly whose other
members are at x and y, but prefers a candidate at x to one at z to complete an assembly whose
other members are at y and z.  Again preferences are not separable.  
These two examples differ markedly both in the nature of the outcome spaces and the
outcome rule of the assemblies.  Nevertheless, it is no coincidence that in both cases assemblyBenoit/Kornhauser
However these examples differ with respect to “top-separability”.  See footnote 13.
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For instance, if the outcomes are points on an interval, one restriction would be that each
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voter has an ideal point and prefers A to B if A is closer to this ideal point.
5
preferences are not separable.   We now generalize these examples. 
9
  We consider the election of an m-sized assembly.  Let Y denote an outcome space. 
Voters are assumed to have well defined preferences over the elements of Y.  Each candidate
espouses a certain outcome.  An outcome rule f determines the implemented outcome as a
function of the outcomes espoused by those candidates who are elected.  Let a 0 Y, b 0 Y, for ii
i=1,...,m.  We say that a voter's assemblies preferences are derived from her outcome preferences
if she prefers assembly {a ,...a } to {b ,...b } if and only she prefers f{a ,...a } to f{b ,...b }.   1m 1m 1m 1m
For ease of expostion we assume that for all a 0 Y and outcome rules f, f{a,a,...,a} = a.  ii i i i
We identify each candidate with the outcome she espouses. 
We say that an outcome rule is non-compromising if for any set of m outcomes A =
{a ,...a }, f{A} = a, for some a 0 A.  Otherwise, the rule is said to be compromising.  In words, 1m i i
a non-compromising outcome rule always selects the outcome espoused by some assembly
member.  A compromising rule may result in an outcome which represents a "compromise" of
the various positions.
For the following theorem, we assume that any outcome might be some voter's strictly
favorite outcome.  Beyond this, however, the voters' preferences over outcomes may be subject to
any restriction.  
10
Theorem 1:  Suppose that voters' preferences are derived from their outcome preferences
and that the outcome rule is compromising.  Then, no matter what restrictions are placed upon
the form of outcome preferences, there is a group of candidate positions so that some (potential)
voter's preferences are not separable, when the set of candidates running includes this group.Benoit/Kornhauser
6
Proof (reductio):  Suppose that all voters always have separable preferences and let A =
{a ,...a } be such that for all a 0 A, f{A} û a.  Let the set of candidates include m candidates at 1m i i
each position a 0 A.  Consider a voter whose (strictly) favorite outcome is f{A}.  Since f{A} is i
the voter’s favorite outcome and f{a ,a ,...,a } û a , {a ,a ,...,a } > {a ,a ,...,a }.  Separability 12 m m 12 m mm m
then implies (iteratively) that a > a   for some iûm . Without loss of generality, suppose that a  > im 1
a .  Now {a ,a ,...,a } > {a ,a ,...,a } implies that a > a  for some iû 1 ( and û m). Without loss of m1 2 m 1 1 1 i 1
generality suppose that a  > a .  Continuing in this manner we obtain a cycle among all the 21
candidates.
Q.E.D.
  Although the proof of theorem 1 is rather trivial, the theorem’s consequences are far
reaching.  When assembly preferences are derived from outcome preferences via an outcome rule
which admits of any sort of compromise among the proposed outcomes of the assembly
members, then preferences cannot be presumed separable.  As we shall see, even with an
appropriate non-compromising outcome rule, preferences will not be separable unless severe
conditions are imposed upon the way individuals can rank the outcomes.  
Consider an election for a three-member assembly.  From theorem 1 we know that if
preferences are to be separable, then the outcome rule must be non-compromising.  Thus, it must
be the case that for any arbitrary proposed outcomes a , a , and a , f{a ,a ,a } = [a  or  a  or  a ].  1 2 3 123 1 2 3
S a y  t h a t  f { a, a, a}  =  a.   S a y  a l s o  t h a t  f { a, a, a }  =   a. 123 1 234 2
Consider any voter whose favorite outcome is a .  Since f{a ,a ,a } = a , separability 2 123 1
implies that this voter prefers  a  to a .  Hence, if assembly preferences are to be separable, the 41  
voter’s outcome preferences must satisfy restrictions (which depend upon the outcome rule).  A
simple generaliztion of this example yields:
Theorem 2: If no a priori restriction is placed upon voters' preferences over outcomes,Benoit/Kornhauser
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then there is a set of candidates and a voter whose preferences are not separable.
Proof: A simple generalization of the above example.
While theorem 2 is negative, it is not unusual to impose restrictions upon voters’
preferences.  For instance, in a one-dimensional model voter preferences are often assumed to be
single-peaked.  If the outcome rule is non-compromising and we impose suitable restrictions on
outcome preferences,  then assembly preferences will be separable.  However, the necessary
restrictions are (inordinately) severe.  
To get a feel for how severe the restrictions must be, consider an election in which the
outcome space Y = [0,1].  Theorem 1 tells us that if preferences are to be separable, the outcome
rule must be non-compromising.  One oft-discussed such rule is the median voter rule, where the
oucome is given by the median assembly member’s position.  We first note that with a median
voter rule, preferences cannot be presumed separable.  
Proposition 1:  Suppose the outcome space Y = [0,1] and the assembly size m is odd. 
Suppose the outcome rule f is the median voter rule and that voters' preferences are derived from
their outcome preferences. Then, no matter what restriction is imposed upon the form of outcome
preferences, there exists a group of candidates such that if the candidates running includes this
group, then all voters whose (strictly) favorite outcome is in the interior of the outcome space
have preferences that are not separable.
Proof: Let the set of candidates include one candidate at each voter’s favorite outcome as
well as (m+1)/2 candidates at a position a  to the left of any “interior” voter and (m+1)/2 l 
candidates at a position a to the right of any interior voter.  Consider any voter j with favorite r
outcome a. The (sub)assembly consisting of (m-1)/2 candidates at a , candidate a ,and [(m-1)/2 - j l j
1] candidates at a , will result in the outcome a if completed with a candidate a , and a if rl l j
completed with a candidate a , so that j will prefer a to a here.  On the other hand, similar rr lBenoit/Kornhauser
Of course, separable assembly preferences may still be justified on other grounds.
     11
See Benoit and Kornhauser (1991) for a proof of this propostion. 
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reasoning shows that j prefers a to a to complete the (sub)assembly comsisting of [(m-1)/2 - 1] lj
candidates at a , candidate a ,and (m-1)/2 candidates at a.  Hence j’s preferences are not l j r
separable.
Q.E.D.
Thus, the median voter rule will induce non-separable preferences.  Now, for
concreteness, suppose that the assembly consists of three members.  With Y = [0,1], for
preferences to be separable then, say, f{.3,.4,.5} = [.3, .4, or .5]. Since the median voter rule will
not work, consider the rule f{A} = min a 0 A. Take a voter whose favorite outcome is .3.  Since i
f(.3,.4,.9) > f(.2,.3,.4), separability implies that the voter ranks outcome .9 above .2!  This is
certainly an unusual requirement, and it is in this sense that we say that the restrictions necessary
to guarantee separable preferences are severe.  With the outcome rule min a, assembly i
preferences will be separable if, for instance, outcome preferences are single-peaked and all
outcomes greater than a voter's favorite outcome are preferred to all outcomes smaller than the
favorite.
Thus, broadly speaking, the assumption of separable assembly preferences is
incompatible with deriving these preferences from outcome preferences.   However, while
11
separability is sufficient for the possibility of simple voting, it is not necessary.  A necessary and
sufficient condition for being able to vote simply for k candidates is given by k-top separability,
defined below.
12
Definition:  An individual has k-top separable preferences if there exists a set of k
candidates, called the individual's top candidates, such that if a is a top candidate and a is not a ijBenoit/Kornhauser
Notice one important difference between theorems 1 and 3.  From theorem 1, given the
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"right" set of candidates, adding more will not alter the non-separability of a voter’s preferences. 
However, for some outcome functions, the same is not true for top-separability.  For instance,
suppose Y = {x,R *x = 0 or 1), m is odd, and f = majority rule on each issue.  Then a voter’s
n
i
preferences will be 1-top separable if there is a candidate that espouses his favorite outcome.
9
top candidate, then {a}UA  $ {a}UA  for all A . i ij j ij ij
The set of candidates used in the proof of theorem 1 establishes the following theorem:
Theorem 3:  Suppose that voters’ preferences are derived from their outcome preferences
and that the outcome rule is compromising.  Then, no matter what restrictions are placed upon
outcome preferences, there is a set of candidates for which some voter’s preferences are not k-top
separable for all k less than the total number of candidates.
While this negative result parallels theorem 1,  the weaker requirement of k-top
13
separability permits the following positive proposition.
Proposition 2:  Let the assembly size m be odd.  Let the outcome space be Y = [0,1] and
let the outcome rule be the median voter rule.   Suppose each voter j has single-peaked
preferences.  Then the assembly preferences derived from these outcome preferences are 1-top
separable.
Proof: Let p be a candidate/position that j weakly favors most among all the active j
candidate positions.  We will show that p is in j’s 1-top set.  Let a be a candidate/position no ji
better than p.  Let A  be a set of (m-1) candidates not including p or a.  We show that pUA  $ ji j j i j i j
aUA .  Without loss of generality, suppose that the median candidate of pUA  is (weakly)to the ii j ji j
right of p.  Then if a is to the left of p, then aUA  and pUA  yield the same outcome, or aUA j i j i ij j ij i ij
yields a and pUA  yields p.  If a to the right of p then either aUA  and pUA  yield the same i j ij j i j i ij j ij
outcome, or the median candidate of aUA  is further to the right than the median candidate of ii j
pUA .  Since i) the median candidate of pUA  is to the right of p, ii) p is the position that j ji j ji j j jBenoit/Kornhauser
See Sudgen (1984) for details.
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weakly favors amongst all the candidate positions, and iii) preferences are single-peaked, pUA ji j
is preferred to aUA . ii j
                     Q.E.D.
CANDIDATE PREFERENCES ARE MISLEADING
In a provocative article, Sugden (1984) analyzes candidate-based assembly elections.  He
explicitly recognizes the primacy of assembly preferences.  Thus, he begins his analysis by
assuming that voters have lexicographic assembly preferences, from which candidate preferences
are derived.  Having done this, however, he then proceeds dubiously from a candidate-based
perspective.
 Using the notion of "election by free association" Sugden argues for the appropriately
defined core of the candidate voting game.   The following example satisfies all of his
14
assumptions.  The example can also be understood without reference to Sugden’s article.  
There are five candidates running for three seats.  The candidates are labelled a  through 1
a  from left to right. Preferences over candidates are lexicographic and single-peaked.  There are 5
123 voters who divide into four groups with candidate and corresponding assembly rankings
given in tables 1 and 2 below:





31 Voters 29 Voters 32 Voters 31 Voters
1 s t aaaa 234 5
2nd a a a a 323 4
3 r d aaaa 442 3Benoit/Kornhauser
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4 t h aaaa 111 2
5 t h aaaa 555 1





31 Voters 29 Voters 32 Voters 31 Voters
1st aaa aaa aaa aaa 234 234 234 345
2 n d aaa aaa aaa aaa 231 123 134 245
3 r d aaa aaa aaa aaa 235 235 345 145
4 t h aaa aaa aaa aaa 124 134 124 235
5th a a a aaa aaa aaa 245 345 245 135
6 t h aaa aaa aaa aaa 125 135 145 125
7 t h aaa aaa aaa 134 124 123 aaa 234
8 t h aaa aaa aaa aaa 345 245 235 134
9 t h aaa aaa aaa aaa 135 125 135 124
1 0 t h aaa aaa aaa aaa 145 145 125 123
T h e  c o r e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  b y  f r e e  a s s o c i a t i o n  g a m e  i s  t h e  a s s e m b l y  aaa.   L ooking strictly 245
at the candidate ranking this seems like a reasonable choice.  Each of the three most populous
groups gets one candidate.
Looking at the assembly ranking, however, quite a different picture emerges.  Assembly
aaa s e e m s  c l e a r l y  s u p e r i o r  t o  aaa.   A bout 3/4 of the population ranks assembly aaa f i r s t .   234 245 234
On the other hand, aaa i s  r a n k e d  f i r s t  b y  n o  o n e  a n d  i s  r a n k e d  s e c ond by only about 1/4 of the 245
population.  While aaa i s  r a n k e d  s e v e n t h  b y  t h e  3 1  p e o p l e  w h o  d o  n o t  r a n k  i t  f i r s t ,  aaa i s 234 245
ranked eighth by 29 people and fifth by 63.  Even if we make the bold assumption that electing
one’s first ranked candidate is especially important, so that a ranking in the top six positions isBenoit/Kornhauser
With lexicographic preferences (as opposed to those which are only separable) there is a one-
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to-one correspondence between candidate preferences and assembly preferences.  Hence, the
information contained in the candidate rankings alone is sufficient to make our
point here.  Nonetheless, as the example shows, looking only at the candidate rankings can be
misleading.
Sugden does not restrict the set of potential candidates.
     16
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e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t w o  m o r e  p e o p l e  r a n k  aaa i n  t h e  t o p  s i x  t h a n  d o  s o  f o r  aaa 245 234
d o e s  n o t  o u t w e i g h  aaa’ s  o t h e r  a d v a n t a g e s .   I n d e e d ,  aaa i s  n o t  o n l y  a  m a j o r i t y  r u l e  w i n n e r ,  b u t 234 234
is also the Borda count winner.  In any case, it is striking how much better aaa l ooks with 245
respect to the candidate preferences than with respect to the assembly preferences.
15
More seriously, in addition to his maintained hypothesis that preferences are
lexicographic, at one point (page 37) Sugden goes on to make the apparently innocuous
assumption that assemblies reach decisions according to a median voter rule.  However, as
proposition 1 indicates, the median voter assumption is inconsistent with the assumption that
preferences are separable.  Since lexicographic preferences are separable, all these assumptions
cannot be maintained.   
16
CONCLUSION
The assumption of separable assembly preferences is convenient in the analysis of
candidate-based election procedures.  However, this assumption is not warranted if assembly
preferences are derived from preferences over legislative outcomes.  Assembly preferences need
not be derivative in this manner, and separability may still be justified on other grounds.  Even if
this is the case, in analyzing assembly elections it is important not to rush too quickly to a
candidate-based perspective.   Benoit/Kornhauser
13
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